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CALIFORNIA LIQUOR LIABILITY: COLE v. RUSH
REVIVED?
I. INTRODUCTION
As a major social activity, the consumption of intoxicating beverages
provides a livelihood for liquor dispensers nationwide. Recent figures
indicate that in California alone there are over twenty-five thousand
liquor licenses issued to establishments for consumption on the prem-
ises, while a nearly equal number are granted for off-sale distribution.'
Such an active trade is not, of course, unregulated. In 1935, the legisla-
ture enacted the "Alcoholic Beverage Control Act" (ABCA).2 Chapter
16 of this Act is comprised of the liquor industry's regulations, which
are phrased in language common to criminal statutes. During this dec-
ade, however, these regulatory provisions have been used as a basis for
the imposition of civil liability. Such an application is only authorized
when the court, under common law principles, accepts as controlling
the standards set forth in statutory provisions. 3 When this occurs in the
context of liquor liability, the applicable statutes are generally charac-
terized as "dram shop acts."4
Although civil liability based on the a violation of an alcoholic bev-
1. A recent report by the Alcoholic Beverage Commission [Licenses as of June 30, 1978]
states that on-sale calendar year licenses are approximately 29,108, and off-sale fiscal year
24,106. A comparison of figures distributed a year earlier [Licenses as of April 1, 1977],
showing on-sale as 27,071, and off-sale 23,209, demonstrates the general progression of the
industry.
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 23000-25763 (West 1964).
3. Alber v. Owens, 66 Cal. 2d 790, 798-99, 427 P.2d 781, 787, 59 Cal. Rptr. 117, 123
(1967); Kindt v. Kaufman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 866, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 617 (1976) (Fried-
man, acting P.J., dissenting).
4. There is a notion that only statutes which specifically create a civil cause of action are
technically "dramshop acts," and that civil liability formulated by case decision, even
though primarily based on standards of care as enunciated in regulatory provisions, encom-
passes a "common law" rule. See generally Keenan, Liquor Liability in California 14 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 46 (1973). Some early forms of dram shop acts, in fact, did not require that the
purveyance of liquor be illegal before liability could attach. J. Lawson, The 'ivilRemedyfor
Injuries Arising from the Sale or Gift of Intoxicating Liquor, in FREEMAN, THE BOOK OF
MONOGRAPHS (1877) from The Central Law Journal (1877); H. BLACK, INTOXICATING LI-
QUORS 352 (1892). Dram shop acts are generally directed at the operators of drinking sa-
loons where liquors are sold to be drunk on the premises, and at.the owners of buildings and
premises in which the operators are tenants. J. Appleman, Civil Liability Under the Illinois
Dram Shop Act, 34 Nw. U.L. REv. 30 (1939). The subsequent textual discussion will show
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erage control act has existed in various forms since the 1850's in other
states, 5 California has only recently adopted the view that a presump-
tion of negligence arises when a person furnishes liquor in a manner
prohibited by statute.6 Prior to 1971, this state adhered to the princi-
ples enunciated in Cole v. Rush,7 which held that, absent a statute to the
contrary, the sale of intoxicants is not the proximate cause of injuries
subsequently received by a purchaser even though the injuries may
have resulted from the consumption of alcoholic beverages.8 This bar
to recovery was abolished by the California Supreme Court in Vesely v.
Sager,9 where a third party was allowed to maintain an action for inju-
ries suffered as a result of the acts of an inebriate.' 0 That decision has
been followed by a barrage of civil litigation initiated by parties who
have sustained injuries caused by another's intoxication and directed
against the person who furnished the alcohol for consumption."
Moreover, the class of individuals permitted to sue has significantly in-
creased. In construing the purpose of the applicable statutes, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that the patron who voluntarily consumed
the intoxicating beverages was within the class of those meant to be
protected. 12
The ramifications of the Vesely decision, however, did not become
apparent until several years after it was announced. When the court
that this definition, when applied to modem California jurisprudence, is much too restric-
tive.
5. In 1853, the Indiana legislature passed a statute similar to the contemporary dram shop
acts. Ohio and Pennsylvania followed with the adoption of legislation in 1854, as did New
York and Maine in the late 1850's. These enactments apparently were the result of a grow-
ing sentiment which favored prohibition. McGough, Dramshop Acts, 1967 A.B.A. INS.,
NEG. AND COMP. L. 448, 449 [hereinafter cited as McGough].
6. See Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971) (defendant
liable upon violation of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 when violation proximately
caused plaintiff's injuries, and occurrence of injury and injured party were within purview of
statute).
7. 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955).
8. Id. at 350, 289 P.2d at 453. See also Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d
952 (1944) (no liability on defendant liquor seller when intoxicated patron fell from bar stool
and was then dragged on floor by defendants); H. JOYCE, THE LAW RELATING TO INTOXI-
CATING LIQUORS § 421 (1910).
9. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
10. The court refrained, however, from deciding the viability of an action by the person
served alcoholic beverages in violation of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 26502. 5 Cal. 3d at
157, 486 P.2d at 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
11. Prior to the Vesely decision, a third party could maintain an action at common law
against the intoxicated patron for injuries proximately caused by her negligent acts.
12. Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978)
(plaintiffs permitted to maintain wrongful death action against bowling alley when young
father died of acute alcohol poisoning).
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created a common law rule of liability as a means of protecting mem-
bers of the general public, '3 one might have expected that only those in
the business of dispensing spirituous liquors' 4 would need to concern
themselves with potential liability. This idea is consistent with the
designation of civil liability statutes as "dram shop laws."' 5 Neverthe-
less, at least one California court has chosen to extend liability to non-
commercial suppliers of alcohol. 6 In so doing, that court reasoned that
the language of the statute was not limited to persons who furnish li-
quor for profit, and held that it was a "fundamental principle" that a
person is liable for injuries proximately caused by his or her failure to
exercise reasonable care."
In light of the rapid expansion of civil liability, the legislature re-
sponded by amending section 25602 of the Business and Professions
Code and section 1714 of the Civil Code.'8 The amendments, as en-
13. 5 Cal. 3d at 165, 486 P.2d at 160, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (conclusion that purpose of
§ 26502 is to protect members of general public from injury to person and damage to prop-
erty resulting from excessive use of intoxicating liquor compelled by CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 23001, which states that one purpose of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act is to
protect safety of people of the state).
14. Those in the "business" include both the owners of dram shops and those operating
the enterprise of spirituous liquor dispensation. 45 AM. JUR. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors
§§ 596, 598 (1969).
15. The term "dram shop" is estimated to have originated in the middle 1800's. Its birth
was the product of the pre-prohibition era when dramshop described those inns where li-
quor could be sold in measured quantities of less than a gallon. Other inns were forced to
sell quantities sometimes in excess of 30 gallons by command of statutes enacted in the wake
of temperance reform. McGough, supra note 5, at 448.
16. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
17. Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539. The court further noted that the
"commonly known outward manifestations" produced by intoxication are as readily appar-
ent to a social host as they would be in a commercial context. Id. at 155, 577 P.2d at 677,
145 Cal. Rptr. at 542. Query whether this conclusion disregards the liberal attitude to "serve
yourself," which is quite prevalent in social gatherings. The court's reasoning, based on
People v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 973, 185 P.2d 105 (1947), fails to recognize the
factual disparity centering on the personal contact in a commercial setting where the seller
"serves the customer." Id. at 975-76, 185 P.2d at 106 (emphasis added).
18. Chapter 929 (Senate Bill No. 1645) of the Statutes of 1978 contains the amendments
to Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 and Civ. CODE § 1714 which now read as follows:
§ 25602
(a) Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given
away, any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously
intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(b) No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished or given away,
any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be civilly liable to
any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries inflicted on that person as a
result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage.
(c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the hold-
ings in cases such as Veseiy v. Sager (5 Cal 3d 153), Bernhard v Harrah's Club (16 Cal
3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior Court (- Cal. 3d-) be abrogated in favor of prior
1979]
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acted, essentially abrogate the holdings in Vesel, and its progeny, and
reinstate prior judicial interpretation "so that . . . civil liability to a
third party is incurred solely by the intoxicated person.'"'9 Although
the legislature has chosen to specifically prohibit the imposition of civil
liability in particular instances,21 the effect of earlier decisions has only
been partially annulled2' since the expressed legislative intent is that
the amended statutes will only operate prospectively.22 Therefore,
plaintiffs with a cause of action accruing before the effective date of the
amendments will be unaffected.
This comment will examine the development of liquor liability
through the cases preceding the amendments and then discuss the im-
pact of these recent enactments.
Judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages as the proximate
cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
§ 1714
(a) Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of
his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary
care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such cases is defined by
the Title on Compensatory Relief.
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such as Vesely v.
Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bernhard v. Harrah 's Club (16 Cal 3d 313), and Coulter v. Supe-
rior Court (- Cal. 3d-) and to reinstate thepriorjudicial interpretation of this section as
it relates to proximate causefor injuries incurred as a result offurnishing alcoholic bever-
ages to an intoxicatedperson, namely that thefurnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the
proximate cause of injuries resultingfrom intoxication, but rather the consumption of alco.
holic beverages is theproximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated
person.
(c) No social host who /urnishes alcoholic beverages to any person shall be held legally
accountablefor damages suffered by such person, orfor injury to the person or property of,
or death of, any third person, resulting from the consumption of such beverages.
(Changes or additions are indicated by italics).
19. Legislative Counsel's Digest, Chapter 929 (Senate Bill No. 1645) of the Statutes of
1978. An exception to this proposition is found in newly enacted § 25602.1 of the Bus. &
PROF. CODE where an action may be brought against a person licensed pursuant to Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 23300 for injury or death proximately caused by "furnishing" alcoholic bev-
erages to an obviously intoxicated minor.
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(c) (West Supp. 1979), states that the imposition of liability is
prohibited in instances where an intoxicated person inflicts injury upon a third person. In
addition, the bill specifically prohibits the imposition of liability for injuries or death to the
person who consumes alcoholic beverages when served by a social host. See note 18, supra.
21. Legislative Counsel Vion Gregory indicated in a letter to Senator Ruben Ayala, the
author of Senate Bill No. 1645, that the amended provisions would not affect causes of
action which accrue prior to January 1, 1979. L.A. Daily J., Oct. 27, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
22. In failing to give the statute retroactive effect the legislature, as stated by Mr. Gregory,
relied upon the notion that a right to sue for damages is a right which vests when the cause
of action arises, and one which cannot be retroactively divested by legislative act. L.A.
Daily J., Oct. 27, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
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II. HISTORY OF DRAM SHOP LAW IN CALIFORNIA
As stated above, California has been slow to extend civil liability to
inebriate-related injuries. Statutes enacted in other states as early as
1853 imposed civil responsibility on saloonkeepers for harm resulting
from the sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages.2 3 Prior to 197 1,24
however, California case law, as developed in four major decisions,25
refused to recognize such liability. Mere dicta in the first of these deci-
sions, Lammers v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co.,26 culminated in the rule of
non-liability espoused in the last, Cole v. Rush. 7 Cole held that an
action could not be maintained against a vendor of alcoholic beverages
for injuries sustained by an intoxicated patron. The rationale underly-
ing this holding was that the consumption, not the sale, of liquor was
the proximate cause of subsequent injury or death.28
23. See note 5 supra.
24. The landmark case of Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1971), abolished a well established rule prohibiting the imposition of civil liability.
25. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955), overruled, Vesely v. Sager 5 Cal. 3d
153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971); Lammers v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 186 Cal. 379,
199 P. 532 (1921) overruled, 5 Cal. 3d 153,486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971); Fleckner v.
Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143
P.2d 952 (1943).
26. 186 Cal. 379, 199 P. 532 (1921), overruled, Vesely v. Sager 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151,
95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). In Lammers, the plaintiff was ejected from the defendant railroad's
train for failing to produce a passenger ticket. The court held the defendant not liable for
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff when he was subsequently struck by another train. It
reasoned that the injuries were caused by the volitional act of the plaintiff in returning from
a place of safety to a position of danger. In rejecting the allegation that the defendant's acts
were the proximate cause of the harm the court emphasized:
The only connection between the ejection and the injury would be the fact that if there
had been no ejection there would have been no injury. The sale of the whisky to the
plaintiff would come nearer being a proximate cause of the injury than the ejection
from the railway train. The peril arising from the ejection ceased the moment the pas-
senger left the position where he could be struck by defendant's trains, while the peril
arising from the use of the intoxicating liquor continued in operation up to the time of
the injury and contributed thereto, and yet it has been uniformly held in the absence of
a statute to the contrary that the sale of intoxicating liquor is not the proximate cause of
injuries subsequently received by the purchaser because of his intoxication.
Id. at 384, 199 P. at 525 (citations omitted).
27. 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955). In affirming the judgment of the lower court, the
court stated:
(1) that as to a competent person it is the voluntary consumption, not the sale or gift,
of intoxicating liquor which is the proximate cause of injury from its use; (2) that the
competent person voluntarily consuming intoxicating liquor contributes directly to any
injury caused thereby; and (3) that contributory negligence of the defendant bars recov-
ery by his heirs or next of kin in a wrongful death action. .. ."
Id. at 356, 289 P.2d at 457. It is important to note that the court regarded Mr. Cole as a
competent person and therefore denied recovery to the plaintiffs. An allegation that the
decedent was an habitual drunkard may have produced a different result.
28. See 45 AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553. For exceptions to this general rule,
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Shortly after the decision in Cole, courts in several jurisdictions over-
turned common law rules which had refused to recognize the sale or
gift of alcoholic beverages as a proximate cause of inebriant-related
injuries.29 These reevaluations, however, did not spur a universal rec-
ognition of a need for the imposition of liability upon saloonkeepers for
their negligent acts or for those of their employees.3 0 Nevertheless,
courts in many states did adopt similar rules.3 Still other states dealt
with the problem legislatively, by passing statutes that imposed civil
liability for furnishing intoxicants to a patron who caused injury by
reason of his intoxication.
3 2
A. Vesely v. Sager
In 1971, the California Supreme Court decided Vesely v. Sager, a
unanimous decision which imposed a duty of care on vendors of alco-
holic beverages to their patrons. Though the court took a bold step in
see Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153 n.3, 159, 486 P.2d 151, 155 n.3, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 n.3
(1971).
29. At the forefront of cases abrogating the common law rule are Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959); and Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188,
156 A.2d 1 (1959). For an excellent discussion of these cases and the imposition of civil
liability in other jurisdictions, see Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in Caif/ornia, 14 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 46 (1973).
30. In 12 AM. JuR. Trials, Dram Shop Litigation § 14 (1966) note is made of the fact that
the owner's employees, ie., the bartenders and waitresses, may be named as party defend-
ants, but the author cautions that the jury may be hesitant to return a large verdict if it
believes a salaried employee may have to bear a share of the cost.
31. See, e.g., Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Davis v.
Shiappacossee, Fla., 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847
(1966); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161,
290 N.W. 482 (1940).
32. The National Licensed Beverage Association Compendium of State Beverage Alcohol
Laws, as of October, 1978, notes the following Dram Shop Acts: ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 120,
121 (1958); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-103 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102
(West 1960) (limiting liability to an aggregate sum of $50,000.00); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4,
§ 711 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1205 (Harrison 1958); ILL. ANN. REV. STAT. ch. 43,
§ 135 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1978) (limiting recovery to $15,000.00 for injuries and $20,000.00
for loss of support); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.92, 123.93 (West 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 2002 (1964) (provides recovery in exemplary damages); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18.993, 18.993(1) (1957) (intoxicated person must be named as defendant and retained
until action is concluded or no right of action against vendor allowed); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.95 (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. GEN. OBLIo. LAW art. 11, § 11-101 (McKinney 1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4399.01, 4399.02 (Page 1973);
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.730 (1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 3-11-1 (1956); S.D. CODE LAWS § 35-4-78 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501
(1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (West Supp. 1978); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 12-5-502 (1977)
(notification required before vendor liable).
33. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971) (opinion by Wright, C.J.).
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overturning precedent, it limited its ruling to a situation where a com-
mercial licensee is sued by a third party who was injured as a result of
the patron's inebriation.34 In Vesel,, the defendant was the owner and
operator of a public tavern located near the top of a mountain. The
complaint, upon which a demurrer had been sustained without leave to
amend, alleged that the defendant caused a customer to be served large
quantities of alcoholic beverages for over seven hours. It further al-
leged that the defendant knew that his customer was becoming exces-
sively intoxicated, and that the only road leading from the tavern was a
"very steep, winding, and narrow mountain road" which the patron
would be required to take upon departure. When the intoxicated pa-
tron attempted to negotiate the turns on the road he allegedly crossed
into the lane of an oncoming vehicle. The vehicles collided and the
plaintiff was injured.
As averred, the defendant was charged with a duty of care under
section 25602 of the Business and Professions Code.35 A violation of
this statute when read in conjunction with section 669 of the Evidence
Code was held to raise a presumption of negligence in favor of any
person who is a member of the class for whose protection the statute
was enacted.36 Since the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff
was a member of that class, and that the complaint stated facts that
would allow a recovery under section 25602,17 it reversed the lower
court's contrary ruling.
With deference to the reasoning of cases that had abandoned the
common law rule of non-liability, the Chief Justice applied the sub-
stantial factor test to find that the defendant's actions may have proxi-
mately caused the plaintiffs injuries, since the intervening act of the
patron, even if intentional, was reasonably foreseeable.38 Thus, elimi-
34. Id. at 157, 486 P.2d at 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
35. Prior to the recent amendment of this statute (see note 18 supra) § 25602 provided:
"Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any
alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated
person is guilty of a misdemeanor."
36. Section 669(a) codified a standing presumption within the state by providing that:
The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) he violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property;
(3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the
class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.
37. See note 13 and accompanying text.
38. 5 Cal. 3d at 163-64, 486 P.2d at 158, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630. For a further discussion of
this topic, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965).
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nating the previous roadblock presented by proximate cause, the legal
issues were narrowed to one: whether there existed a duty on the de-
fendant's part to maintain a particular standard of conduct. Because
this question was answered in the affirmative due to the obligation im-
posed by section 25602, the plaintiff's burden was relegated to estab-
lishing the supporting facts at trial.
III. AFTER VESELY
A. Non-commercial Liability. Third Party Plaintiffs
Since Vesely was limited to the issue of the liability of commercial
vendors,3 9 the question of the non-commercial dispenser's, or social
host's, liability remained unanswered. Nonetheless, within a year after
the establishment of a civil cause of action under the regulatory provi-
sions of the ABCA came the chance for the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal, in Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co.,40 to clarify this area. The
action was based, however, not on a violation of section 25602 of the
Business and Professions Code, but on an alleged violation of section
25658.4 1 This latter section contains language similar to the language
of 25602, but its provisions prohibit the sale of liquor to minors rather
than to habitual drunkards.
In Brockett, the court of appeal was again confronted with a case
involving a third party action against a defendant employer.42 The em-
ployer allegedly served his underage employee copious amounts of li-
quor at a Christmas party, placed him in his automobile and directed
him to drive home. The result was an accident in which plaintiffs were
injured. Relying on what the court termed the "impeccable logic" of
Vesely, and concluding that the applicable statute was enacted because
"most minors are neither physically nor mentally equipped to handle
the consumption of intoxicating liquor," the defendant was held liable
for willful disobedience of the law. Although the Brockett court felt
39. As stated in note 10, supra, the Vesely court did not reach the question of liability
owed to the consumer for injuries sustained by reason of his intoxication. The court also
limited its holding to the liability of the subject defendant-a commercial supplier of alco-
hol. 5 Cal. 3d at 157, 486 P.2d at 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
40. 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972).
41. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25658(a) (West 1964) provided that "Every person who
sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage
to any person under the age of 21 years is guilty of a misdemeanor." Section 25658(a)
should now be read in conjunction with the law of Sept. 19, 1978, Cal. Legis. Serv. (ch. 930).
42. The case was first heard under pre- Vesely law (Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co.,
264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968) rev'd on rehearing, 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (1972)), wherein the lower court judgment of dismissal, for failure to state a cause
of action, was reversed. Id. at 71, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
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compelled to impose liability on the employer, it limited its ruling to
the imposition of civil responsibility for furnishing liquor to a minor,
and expressly refused to come to any conclusion regarding the liability
of a social host generally for injuries caused by his intoxicated guests.
43
A pivotal factor in the court's decision was its conclusion that the duty
under section 25658 was unequivocal, and required no exercise ofjudg-
ment.4
Categorically similar to the facts of Brockett is Bennett v. Lettery,45
where a third party plaintiff brought an action against a defendant-
minor alleging a violation of section 25658(a). The defendant was one
of several high school students who pooled money together in order to
purchase liquor for a gathering of friends at his parents' home. After
consuming an entire bottle of whiskey with another friend, one boy
attempted to drive. He eventually lost control of the car, striking and
injuring the plaintiff. Because the boys poured their own drinks and
served themselves, the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover. It concluded that "[t]he word 'furnish' implies some type of
affirmative action," and that mere contribution to a fund to purchase
liquor was not sufficient to constitute an act of furnishing within the
purview of the statute.46
Substantial recognition was finally given to a third party action in-
volving a non-commercial defendant in the absence of a "special class"
in Coffman v. Kennedy.47 Although the court concluded that the plain-
tiff's complaint was insufficient to state a cause of action, it adopted the
following rule:
Ordinarily, a host who makes available intoxicating liquors to an adult
guest is not liable for injuries to third persons resulting from the guest's
intoxication. There might be circumstances in which the host would have
a duty to deny his guest further access to alcohol. This would be the case
where the host "has reason to know that he is dealing with persons whose
43. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 93-94, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
44. The court apparently, and with good cause, held the employer liable because he un-
hesitatingly supplied copious amounts of liquor to a minor, a member of a "special class."
The court emphasized that its decision hinged on the fact that the employer did "knowingly
make available" the intoxicants for the minor's consumption. Id. at 94, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756
(emphasis in original). The implication of this statement is that merely providing an oppor-
tunity for a minor to consume intoxicating beverages is not sufficient to impose liability;
rather, knowledge is required.
45. 74 Cal. App. 3d 901, 141 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1977).
46. Id. at 905, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 684. See Calrow v. Appliance Indus., Inc., 49 Cal. App.
3d 556, 568-69, 122 Cal. Rptr. 636, 643-44 (1975) (defendant did not "furnish" liquor to
another within the purview of § 25602 by mere acquiesence or failure to protest the imbibing
of alcohol).
47. 74 Cal. App. 3d 28, 141 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1977).
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characteristics make it especially likely that they will do unreasonable
things." Such persons could include those already severely intoxicated, or
those whose behavior the host knows to be unusually affected by
alcohol...
We think that each case must be decided on its own facts, and we reject
the rule suggested by the defendants that furnishing alcohol to others in a
social setting, even if the hosts acts unreasonably, can never give rise to
liability for acts of the guest whose intoxication results.4"
Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for breach of duty owed to her
by the defendant. She did not allege that the defendant negligently and
unlawfully furnished intoxicating beverages to an obviously intoxicated
person. Nor did she allege that the defendant had knowledge that the
intoxicated person was going to be driving on public streets.49
There were no such defects, however, in the plaintiffs pleadings in
Coulter v. Superior Court.50 In Coulter, the defendants were an owner
and operator of an apartment complex and the apartment manager.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants negligently and carelessly served
"extremely large quantities" of liquor to one Williams, that defendants
knew or should have known that Williams was becoming "excessively
intoxicated," and that defendants knew or should have known that she
was "incapable of exercising the same degree of volitional control over
her consumption of alcoholic beverages as the average reasonable per-
son."" The complaint further alleged that defendants knew that Wil-
liams intended to drive after drinking, and that they knew or should
have known of the foreseeable risk of harm to third persons.
Plaintiffs cause of action arose when the car in which Mr. Coulter
was riding, driven by Williams, collided with roadway abutments after
Williams lost control of the car.52
After examining several sections of the ABCA, the Coulter court re-
ferred to the Coffman and Brocketi decisions to support its conclusion
that civil liability may be imposed on a non-commercial supplier of
48. Id. at 36, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 272 (italics in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Wiener
v. Gamma Phi Chap. of Alpha Tau Omega Frat., 258 Or. 632, 639-40, 485 P.2d 18, 21-22
(1971) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
49. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 37, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 272. In its decision, the court directed the trial
judge to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the deficiencies in her original com-
plaint. Id.
50. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
51. Id. at 148, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 534. See Coffman v. Kennedy, 74 Cal.
App. 3d 28, 34 & n.2, 141 Cal. Rptr. 267, 270-71 & n.2 (1977), for reference to the variance in
the application of the prior rule of proximate cause when an "able bodied" person was
involved, and when a minor or obviously intoxicated individual was furnished liquor.
52. The passenger's wife also joined in the action, claiming as damages loss of consortium
and the value of nursing services provided to her husband.
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alcohol pursuant to section 25602.13 In dictum, the court further noted
that civil liability could also be imposed under general negligence prin-
ciples.5 4 The court saw no logical basis for confining the application of
section 25602 to those who furnish liquor for profit.55 Instead, reliance
was placed on the principle that a person is liable for the foreseeable
consequences proximately caused by his or her failure to exercise rea-
sonable care.5 6 The existence of a duty,57 as required by the decision in
Vesely, was held to be primarily a question of law of which foreseeabil-
ity is a primary consideration .5  Factors other than foreseeability, pre-
viously outlined in Rowland v. Christian," were also identified and
applied to the particular circumstances alleged in the case to support a
rule establishing a duty of care and imposing civil liability upon the
defendants. 60 The Coulter majority even incorporated public policy
considerations in order to further substantiate its conclusions. It ar-
gued that injury or death suffered by reason of the acts of an inebriate
are no more easy to accept if it is learned that the driver received his
drinks from a hospitable host rather than at a commercial establish-
53. 21 Cal. 3d at 152, 577 P.2d at 672-73, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38.
54. Id. at 151, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538, quoting Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,
16 Cal. 3d 313, 325, 546 P.2d 719, 726, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 222, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859
(1976), the court stated that "[alIthough we chose to impose liability on the Vesely defendant
on the basis of his violating the applicable statute, the clear import of our decision was that
there was no bar to civil liability under modern negligence law." 21 Cal. 3d at 152, 577 P.2d
at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538 (emphasis in original). The Bernhard court went on to say:
"Certainly, we said nothing in Vesely indicative of an intention to retain the former rule that
an action at common law does not lie." 16 Cal. 3d at 325, 546 P.2d at 726-27, 128 Cal. Rptr.
at 222-23.
55. 21 Cal. 3d at 149, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537. But see note 17 supra.
56. Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539. See also Rowland v. Christian, 69
Cal. 2d 108, 112, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714
(West 1974).
57. The duty imposed by well establishedgeneral negligence principles, independent of
any statutory provisions, is defined as one owed to the general public to refuse to furnish
liquor to "an obviously intoxicated person if, under the circumstances, such person thereby
constitutes a reasonably foreseeable danger or risk of injury to third persons .. " 21 Cal.
3d at 149-50, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537. This definition recognizes and confirms
the idea expressed in Coffman that each factual situation must be independently examined
to determine whether the law will impose such a duty upon the defendant.
58. 21 Cal. 3d at 152, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (quoting Weirum v. RKO
General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (1975)).
59. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
60. As stated by the Rowland court, the factors include:
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden
of the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved. Id. at 113, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
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ment. In addition, it assumed that a social host could be protected
from the ramifications of its decisions by obtaining insurance cover-
age.6 '
One defense asserted by the defendants in Coulter was that the term
"obviously intoxicated" contained in section 25602 is "too broad and
subjective to serve as a satisfactory measure for the imposition of civil
liability. '62 The court rejected this argument, because the average in-
toxicated person exhibits "many commonly known outward manifesta-
tions which are 'plain' and 'easily seen or discovered.' "63 This
observation by the court eliminates any distinction between the obliga-
tory perceptions of a bartender and those of a non-commercial social
host in discovering the inebriated condition of an individual patron or
guest. Such an imposition is not surprising in light of the court's con-
clusion that a reasonably perceptive host can foresee the danger of ulti-
mate harm caused by excessive intoxication as well as any bartender.64
B. Actions by Vendees
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the Vesely court did not ad-
dress all issues related to the imposition of civil responsibility with re-
gard to the furnishing of alcoholic beverages. Subsequent decisions
were therefore necessary to clarify the extent to which the law would
hold a person liable for providing another with inebriants. As a result,
the person who had consumed the intoxicating beverages and was sub-
sequently injured because of his intoxication was initially denied recov-
ery. The rationale underlying the failure of the courts to recognize
such a cause of action was derived from the belief that the vendee
61. 21 Cal. 3d at 153, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539. Although the court realized
that such insurance coverage would doubtless be increasingly costly, it made short shrift of
this realization.
62. Id. at 155, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
63. Id., quoting People v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 973, 975-76, 185 P.2d 105, 106
(1947) (emphasis in original).
64. See 21 Cal. 3d at 153, 577 P.2d at 574, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539. In a concurring opinion
Justice Mosk suggested that some degree of difference should be maintained between li-
censed and social providers of liquor. Arguing that § 25602 prohibits furnishing alcoholic
beverages to an already intoxicated person, he proposed that the plaintiff in an action involv-
ing a social host would be "compelled to prove either (I) that the social host furnished the
liquor knowing that it was likely to, and that it did, produce the original intoxication, or (2)
that the additional liquor served to one already 'obviously intoxicated' increased or
prolonged the existing state of intoxication and to that extent was a proximate cause of the
injury." Id. at 156, 577 P.2d at 676, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 541 (Mosk, J., concurring) (italics in
original). Justice Mosk's suggestion is well taken, but the reason for applying the burden of
proof only in cases regarding the liability of a social host is not clear. This author believes
that confusion of this point cannot be avoided.
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plaintiff was not a member of the general public meant to be protected
from the excessive use of intoxicating liquor.65 Other cases have held
that the inebriate's own concurrent negligence, being a proximate con-
tributing cause of his injuries or death, barred his recovery.66 A less
popular view, but one that nonetheless negated a right to recovery, was
that the vendor and vendee were parties in pari delicto.67 The criminal
fault attributed to the intoxicated patron in this instance is the act of
being under the influence of intoxicating liquor in a public place.
68
When such a relationship exists, and the verisimilar application of this
theory does not run afoul of the purpose of the ABCA,69 the law gener-
ally leaves the parties in the condition in which it finds them, thereby
denying the plaintiff compensation for his injuries.
Prior to 1975, regardless of whether a court considered an intoxicated
patron to be barred by his contributory negligence, his assumption of
the risk,7" or otherwise, the viability of the cause of action was equally
65. See, e.g., Sargent v. Goldberg, 25 Cal. App. 3d 940, 943, 102 Cal. Rptr. 300, 302
(1972) (vendee suffered fatal injuries while being evicted from restaurant); Carlisle v.
Kanaywer, 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 592, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246, 248 (1972) (patron became ill and
choked to death on his own vomit).
66. See Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 194-201, 288 P.2d 12, 17, modified, 289 P.2d
242 (1955) (court examined contributory negligence as a defense to bar recovery in several
situations, including contributory negligence of deceased). Accord, Sargent v. Goldberg, 25
Cal. App. 3d 940, 944, 102 Cal. Rptr. 300, 302 (1972).
67. See, e.g., Cooper v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 394, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 541, 545 (1975) (intoxicated passenger served alcoholic beverages and subsequently
sustained injuries when she fell on the floor of the ladies' toilet).
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(0 (West 1970).
69. The legislature has stated its intention that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act should
effect the purposes of "protection of the safety, welfare, health, peace and morals of the
people of the State." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1964).
70. See Cooper v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 393, 119 Cal. Rptr.
541, 544 (1975). In Cooper, the court responded to the plaintiffs claim of negligence and
stated:
[E]ven though the server is negligent and in violation of law by continuing to serve
alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated drinker, the drinker's cause of action is
barred. . . by his voluntary assumption of the known and conspicuous risks incident to
the consumption of alcoholic beverages in bars. . . . One of these known and conspicu-
ous risks is the possibility that the bartender will negligently fail to recognize the
drinker's obviously intoxicated condition. Thus, when a drinker occupies a stool at a
bar, he implicitly acknowledges the possibility that the bartender may negligently con-
tinue to serve him alcoholic beverages even though he has become intoxicated and acci-
dent-prone as a result of his condition.
Id. at 393-94, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 544 (citations and footnote omitted).
This catch-all argument would prevent recovery by the patron from the vendor unless the
drinker could prove a specific and malicious intent to injure him. Courts have since indi-
cated, however, that even intentional acts by the bartender may not invoke liability. See
Rose v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 58 Cal. App. 3d 276, 279-80, 129 Cal. Rptr. 736,
738 (1976) (attempt to drive a car down a winding road after consuming copious amounts of
beer constitutes a type of voluntary assumption of a known and patent risk that is not merely
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assailable. In that year, the California Supreme Court rendered the
landmark decision of Li v. Yellow Cab Co." That sweeping opinion
overturned well established principles of negligence and promulgated a
preferable system of comparative fault.7 2 Nevertheless, recognition of
the vendee's right to maintain an action in negligence for the excessive
and careless dispensation of liquor did not occur until approximately
three years thereafter.73 In Kindt v. Kauffman, 4 rendered in 1976, the
court of appeal specifically addressed the question whether Li altered
prior law denying a remedy to an injured drunken patron. While con-
ceding that the plaintiff was a member of the general public for whose
protection section 25602 was enacted," the court's rationalization of
relevant considerations allowed no recovery.7 6 The thrust of the deci-
sion was based on its conclusion that a person normally becomes intox-
icated as a result of his own volition and is therefore guilty of willful
misconduct.77 Since the principles of comparative negligence enunci-
ated in Li had not been extended to the area of willful misconduct, and
since the Kindt court refused to so expand the scope of such doctrine,
no civil liability ensued.78
Particular note was made in Kindt that it did not deal with minors or
alcoholics whose special condition makes them extraordinarily suscep-
tible to inebriety, and that such persons may not be guilty of willful
misconduct.79 Nevertheless, the dissent adamantly argued that the ma-
jority's approach to the drunken patron plaintiff, in summarily pro-
nouncing his imbibing of alcohol willful misconduct, constituted a
a variant of contributory negligence, and even in light of Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), bars recovery even in strict liability cases).
71. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
72. The doctrine of comparative negligence adopted in California was designated the so-
called "pure" form whereby a plaintiff may recover even if he is found to be more at fault
than the defendant. Furthermore, the doctrines of last clear chance and, to a certain extent,
assumption of the risk were subsumed under the general process of assessing liability in
proportion to fault. Id. at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
73. See Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
74. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976).
75. Id. at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
76. Id. at 859, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 612. The court not only denied the plaintiff a remedy, but
it found the scales "tipped heavily" against him. Its conclusion was partially confirmed by
the failure of the legislature to enact proposed legislation which would have granted an
injured drunken patron a cause of action. Id.
77. Id. at 852, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
78. Id. at 852, 855, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09. See also Venzor v. Santa Barbara Elks
Lodge, 56 Cal. App. 3d 209, 128 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1976), for a discussion of the applicability of
the last clear chance doctrine in a situation where a vendor's furnishing of alcohol resulted
in the death of its patron.
79. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
[Vol. 12
CALIFORNIA LIQUOR LIABILITY
usurpation of the jury function." It designated the fact of intoxication
as only one of several elements to be considered by the fact-finders in
determining the existence of willful misconduct.8 '
Subsequent to Kindt, an anomaly occurred in the area of liquor lia-
bility. The sought after vendee remedy was granted in Ewing v. Clover
Leaf Bowl, 2 but was obtained under pre-Li law. 3 In its decision, the
Ewing majority expressly disapproved of any suggestion in Kindt that
bartenders owe no duty of care to their patrons.8 4 While granting an
intoxicated patron the right to maintain a cause of action, Ewing also
held, in agreement with the Kindt dissent, that the question of the pa-
tron's willful misconduct is one of fact, and that intoxication in and of
itself does not support a finding that the patron committed willful mis-
conduct as a matter of law.8 5
In Ewing, the defendant's employee, a bartender, intentionally
served a patron, in addition to a couple of beers and a mixed drink, 10
straight shots of 151 proof rum. All the while, the bartender knew that
the patron intended to get drunk to celebrate his twenty-first birthday.
In spite of warnings by the bartender and companions with him at the
time of the dangers of drinking so much liquor too quickly, 6 the pa-
tron drank to excess and eventually passed out. Friends were required
to take him home, where his mother found him dead the next morning.
An autopsy revealed that his death was due to acute alcohol poison-
ing.87 A wrongful death action was brought on behalf of the decedent's
children against the bartender's employer. The complaint alleged that
the bartender had acted both negligently and with willful misconduct
in serving so much alcohol to the decedent. The trial court granted
80. Id. at 866, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 617 (Friedman, acting P.J., dissenting).
81. d. The dissent supports its argument with decisions which hold that contributory
negligence does not per se arise from a finding of intoxication. Id. at 866-67, 129 Cal. Rptr.
at 617.
82. 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978) (opinion by Justice Tobriner
with Justice Clark dissenting).
83. The Ewing complaint was filed on Aug. 10, 1971, three and one-half years prior to the
Li decision. In the promulgation of a new right therefore, the court was confined to pre-Li
contributory negligence principles. Id. at 395 n.l, 572 P.2d at 1156 n.l, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 15
n. 1.
84. Id. at 401 n.8, 572 P.2d at 1160 n.8, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 19 n.8.
85. Id. at 404 n.10, 572 P.2d at 1162 n.10, 143 Cal. Rptr. at n.10.
86. The young patron consumed a vodka collins, 10 shots of 151 proof rum, and two beer
chasers in less than an hour and a half. Id. at 394, 572 P.2d at 1156, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
87. The blood sample taken at the autopsy indicated that the level of alcohol was .47
percent. Generally, a person becomes comatose at a .30-.40 percent alcohol level, while
death due to paralysis of the brain centers is occasioned by a level of .42 percent. Id. at 398,
572 P.2d at 1158, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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defendant's motion for nonsuit because it found: 1) that the decedent's
conduct amounted to contributory negligence as a matter of law, and 2)
that the bartender did not commit willful misconduct. On appeal, the
California Supreme Court reversed the judgment.
The court recognized two chief defenses to the plaintiffs' claims: 1)
proof of the patron's contributory negligence when the bartender's con-
duct amounted to no more than negligence,88 or proof of willful mis-
conduct of the patron, and 2) establishment of the patron's assumption
of the risks accompanying voluntary intoxication as a matter of law.
With regard to the first affirmative defense, it had been held that the
existence of negligence or willful misconduct is a question for the jury.
The court therefore viewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs89 in order to determine whether a jury could reasonably find
that the decedent's conduct amounted to no more than mere negli-
gence, and whether the evidence of the bartender's conduct was reason-
ably susceptible of a finding of willful misconduct.90 If the decedent's
conduct could only be reasonably construed as willful misconduct, a
commission of either negligence or willful misconduct by the bartender
would be irrelevant, and the plaintiffs' cause of action would be barred.
In the final analysis, however, the court held that the findings most
favorable to the plaintiffs could be drawn.
With respect to the second affirmative defense, Le., assumption of
risk, the defendant argued that the patron had assumed the risks ac-
companying the act of voluntary intoxication 9' and the plaintiffs were
therefore barred from recovery as a matter of law. The specific danger
88. See supra note 83.
89. The standard applied by the court when reviewing a nonsuit order is that which pro-
duces the most favorable conclusion in support of plaintiffs' case. 20 Cal. 3d at 402, 572 P.2d
at 1161, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
90. This particular characterization of the actors' conduct is the only one that would sup-
port a finding for the plaintiffs. As stated by the court:
If a jury could reasonably find only that the bartender was negligent and that Ewing
was also negligent, Ewing's contributory negligence would of course bar plaintiffs' re-
covery and justify the trial court's nonsuit. If, however, a jury could find that Lamont's
conduct amounted to willful misconduct, while Ewing's conduct was merely negligence
plaintiffs could recover, and the trial court's nonsuit would be erroneous. Finally, if the
jury could reasonably conclude only that Lamont's conduct and Ewing's conduct con-
stituted similarly willful misconduct, plaintiffs would again be barred.
Id. at 401, 572 P.2d at 1160-61, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 19 (citation omitted).
91. "To warrant the application of the doctrine (of assumption of risk) the evidence must
show that the victim appreciated the specific danger involved. He does not assume any risk
he does not know or appreciate. . . . Stated another way, before the doctrine is applicable,
the victim must have not only general knowledge of a danger, but must have knowledge of
the particular danger, that is, knowledge of the magnitude of the risk involved." Id. at 406,
572 P.2d at 1163-64, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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involved in that case was identified by the court as the risk of acute
alcohol poisoning. After considering the relative naivete and inexperi-
ence of the patron, the majority held that the plaintiffs' evidence had
not conclusively established that the specific risk was one which the
patron appreciated, and therefore could not have been assumed. As a
result, the theory of assumption of the risk could not justify the trial
court's nonsuit, and the plaintiffs' claims were not barred.
92
Shortly after the Ewing decision, the court of appeal decided Paula v.
Gagnon,93 another wrongful death action, wherein the defenses of the
patron's willful misconduct and his assumption of the risk were again
asserted. Although Ewing was cited for the proposition that determina-
tions of willful misconduct are questions for the jury, the court recog-
nized a significant distinction between the facts of that case and those
of the case at hand.94 The issue in Ewing was whether the act of volun-
tary intoxication constituted willfil misconduct as a matter of law,
whereas the Gagnon court was confronted with the question whether
driving while intoxicated amounted to willful misconduct so as to bar
recovery by the decedent's heirs. Refusing to depart from the princi-
ples espoused in Ewing, the court concluded that the complaint did not
reveal willful misconduct as a matter of law, and that the issue should
be decided by the jury.95
The assumption of risk defense asserted in Gagnon was disposed of
by assessing the effect of Li on the doctrine. Since assumption of risk
as a variant of negligence is merged into the system of comparative
fault,96 the doctrine is only applicable to bar recovery where the pa-
tron's conduct "amounts to a release of the defendant's obligation of
reasonable conduct."97 The Gagnon court interpreted Li as dictating
application of the doctrine only in the "clearest instances" of release of
duty. It then concluded that "[a] customer's conduct in requesting and
consuming drinks from a bartender beyond the point of intoxication
does not meet this standard." 98 In the particular facts of this case,
92. Id. at 406-07, 572 P.2d at 1164, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23. This holding encompassed a
conclusion that the courts in Cooper and Rose, supra note 70, "incorrectly characterized the
rules which define whether or not a plaintiff assumed a risk." Id. Therefore, Cooper and
Rose were not controlling here.
93. 81 Cal. App. 3d 680, 146 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1978).
94. Id. at 684, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
95. Id. at 684-85, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 705. This conclusion by the court made it unnecessary
to determine whether a finding that the patron was guilty of'willful misconduct would bar
recovery by the plaintiffs. d. But see id. at 686, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 705 (dicta).
96. See supra note 72.
97. 81 Cal. App. 3d at 685, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
98. Id.
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therefore, the doctrine of assumption of risk was insufficient to bar
plaintiffs' recovery as a matter of law.
The preceding discussion illuminates the proliferation of civil liabil-
ity initiated by Vesely v. Sager. Absent a decision holding a non-com-
mercial supplier of alcohol liable to an intoxicated consumer for injury
or death proximately caused by intoxicants provided by the host,
Vesel, and its progeny have encompassed the four major plaintiff-de-
fendant combinations in the area of liquor liability. Although we
would have expected to see judicially-created vendee actions against
non-commercial suppliers of alcohol, recent legislative amendments
may operate to block such judicial action.99
IV. RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
In response to the need to clarify legislative intent with regard to
specific provisions of the ABCA, the legislature has recently enacted
new statutes and has amended several existing provisions.'00 This ac-
tion appears to have been possibly motivated by a principle in the
Ewing dissent that a line must be located between liability and non-
liability."°  The stated purpose of the legislation was to abrogate the
holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager, Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,
and Coulter v. Superior Court, and to reinstate prior judicial interpreta-
tion of the amended sections.' 02 It is not unquestionably clear, how-
ever, that prior judicial interpretation, represented by the decision in
Cole v. Rush, 0 has been fully reinstated. The common law preceding
Vesely barred all actions against a purveyor of liquor for injury or
death occasioned by the acts of an inebriate, whether the purveyor was
99. See note 104 infra. In as much as the legislature intends prospective application only,
the courts may yet complete their combination of party variables. See notes 21 & 22 supra.
100. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
101. Justice Clark, quoting a passage from Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d
441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971), emphasized that: "'[e]very injury has rami-
fying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is
to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.' . . . '[N]ot every loss can
be made compensable in money damages. and legal causation must terminate somewhere.
In delineating the extent of a tortfeasors responsibility for damages under the general rule of
tort liability. . ., the courts must locate the line between liability and nonliability at some
point, a decision which is essentialiypolitical.'" 20 Cal. 3d at 412, 572 P.2d at 1167, 143 Cal.
Rptr. at 26 (emphasis added by dissent).
102. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1979); CAL. CIVIL CODE
§ 1714(b) (West Supp. 1979).
103. In Cole v. Rush, supra note 7, the court held that: "it is the voluntary consumption,
not the sale or gift, of intoxicating liquor which is the proximate cause of injury from its
use .. " Id. at 356, 289 P.2d at 457. Cf CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1714(b).
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a saloonkeeper or a social host, and whether the plaintiff was a third
party or the inebriate, either suing on his own behalf or, in case of
death, by his heirs. The current legislation, on the other hand, appears
to allow an action for injury to the consumer if brought against a sup-
plier of liquor other than a social host."°  The omission of Paula v.
Gagnon and Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl as- cases specifically abrogated by
the amendments to section 25602 and section 1714 seems to confirm
this deviation from prior common law.'05
In addition to the apparent distinction made between social hosts
and all others in amended section 25602, an actual distinction is present
in newly enacted section 25602.1106 Existing law prohibits all persons
from furnishing alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of
21.107 Section 25602.1, however, authorizes actions only against per-
sons licensed pursuant to section 23300.108 An action brought pursuant
to section 25602.1, however, requires more than merely showing that
intoxicants were furnished to a minor. In addition to the usual require-
104. Although subsection (b) to amended § 25602 clearly states "[n]o person" shall be
liable to "any injured person," the import of the language is not free from ambiguity. Sub-
section (c) appears to alleviate any confusion that the section applies to all actions, whether
brought by a third party or on behalf of the consumer, by providing that "the consumption
of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages [is] the proximate cause
of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 25602(c) (West Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). The implication of this language supports
the view that the legislature only intended to limit vendor liability for injuries inflicted upon
one other than the intoxicated person, ie., third parties. Consider also the language in the
Legislative Counsel's Digest which states that Senate Bill No. 1645 was enacted to "specifi-
cally prohibit the imposition of civil liability in such instance" where civil liability is im-
posed "upon persons who sell, furnish, give or cause to be given alcoholic beverages to an
intoxicated person when such person inflicts injury upon a thirdparty." Legislative Coun-
sel's Digest, 1978 Cal. Legis. Serv. (ch. 929) (emphasis added).
Further support for this proposition can be found in § 1714(c), supra note 18, by its spe-
cific provision that no "social host" shall be legally accountable for injury or death to either
the consumer or third parties injured as a result of the consumption of intoxicating bever-
ages furnished by the host, while no such total immunity is granted to any other party within
any of the new provisions. Query whether this special treatment accorded social hosts might
lead to conflicting constructions of the term, and whether all non-commercial suppliers of
alcohol should be included under the rubric of a social host and therefore obtain statutory
protection.
105. Inasmuch as Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1978), was decided prior to Coulter v. Superior Court 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145
Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978), January 6, 1978 and April 26,1978 respectively, the legislature should
have been fully apprised of the decision at the time that it amended § 25602 and § 1714.
Paula v. Gagnon 81 Cal. App. 3d 680, 146 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1978), on the other hand, was
decided thereafter on June 7, 1978, but a full three months prior to the date the changes were
approved on September 19, 1978.
106. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1979).
107. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658(a) (West 1964).
108. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23300 (West 1964).
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ment of proving that the furnishing of alcohol proximately caused the
injury or death, the plaintiff needs to establish that the minor was obvi-
ously intoxicated at the time he was furnished the intoxicating bever-
age.109 As presently phrased, section 25602.1 is available to both third
parties and minors as a basis for a civil suit.
V. CONCLUSION
A major function of the regulatory provisions of the ABCA is the
deterrence of conduct likely to result in injury to the public. Sections
25602 and 25658, in particular, attempt to deter conduct involving the
excessive and potentially harmful use of intoxicating beverages. The
deterrent factor, however, is not always accompanied by a correlative
right to compensation - the result of recent legislation in the instant
case. Protection from injury caused by a violation of section 25602
once included compensation to the victim. The recent amendments to
the ABCA have circumvented that protection so that an injured third
person is only afforded, by reason of the statute, the preventative pro-
tection effected by fear of the penalties to which a violator of the statute
may be subjected.
Inasmuch as the legislature has abrogated judicial decisions afford-
ing an injured party the right to monetary relief it has rendered a legis-
lativb judgment that granting such relief runs counter to a public policy
favoring immunity. This determination, however, is presently subject
to scrutiny by the Joint Legislative Committee on Tort Liability. No
sooner than the date the recent amendments took effect, the commit-
tee's report"0 recommended the repeal of dram shop immunity stat-
utes. One consideration for this recommendation centers on "the
extreme cost to society of life and limb"' caused by the act of furnish-
ing alcoholic beverages in violation of the statutes. In defense of oppo-
nents of the measure, the report also suggests that a presumption that
the patron assumed the risks of voluntary intoxication should arise by
reason of his conduct in becoming intoxicated.
As a decade of judicial decisions, recent legislation and legislative
recommendations indicate, the area of liquor liability in California is
far from being settled. In all of the political action taken regarding this
109. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1, supra note 106. See Coulter v. Superior Court,
21 Cal. 3d 144, 155, 577 P.2d 669, 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 540 (1978) for a discussion of the
term "obviously intoxicated."
110. Selected provisions of the report and important aspects of some recommendations
are reported in the L.A. Daily J., Jan. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
111. Id. at 17, col. 4.
[Vol. 12
1979] CALIFORNIA LIQUOR LIABILITY 407
area, there seems to be a common understanding that the general pub-
lic needs protection from the abuse in furnishing intoxicating bever-
ages. Differences arise in the extent to which this protection should be
afforded. Nonetheless, if the California Legislature intends to ade-
quately protect the general public from the prohibited use of alcohol, it
should grant an injured party both preventative and compensatory pro-
tection.
Alan G. T69pie

